Russian media, in our research, most commonly consisted of information that was somewhat true and somewhat false. Frequency of disinformation was fairly stable across both time periods. Rates of unverified information, as well as verified information, increased when the war began. None of the different validation markers declined significantly.
As the war began, validity in American media somewhat decreased. One-sided statements decreased, as well as verified information. Information that was partially true and partially false/unverifiable increased.
Russian media showed a steady increase in every type of emotion, excluding hope, after Russia’s entry into Ukraine. Downplaying the seriousness of the event increased most substantially from pre to post war. Before the war, the most commonly used technique was anger. After the beginning of the war, downplaying the seriousness of the situation became the most common emotion. Both anger and downplay appeared at about the same frequency during the beginning of the war.
Our research shows high levels of dread and fear before the beginning of the war. Both of these emotions declined significantly after the start of the war. Levels of sarcasm and comradery dropped slightly. Interestingly, the frequency of fear stayed relatively stable before and after the beginning of the war. Hope significantly increased.
In some capacity, every instance of technique in Russian media increased after the war began. Loaded words was the most frequently used technique in both time periods. Attempts to push blame onto another party, attempts to elicit emotion, and testimony all increased in frequency at similar rates.
Media from the USA was fairly stable in its use of propaganda. The only significant change in technique was a drop in usage of attempts to push blame from one party onto another. Other techniques increased or decreased in amounts that were small enough to be insignificant.